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Hedonic Coalition Formation for Distributed Task
Allocation among Wireless Agents
Walid Saad, Zhu Han, Tamer Bas¸ar, Me´rouane Debbah, and Are Hjørungnes
Abstract—Autonomous wireless agents such as unmanned
aerial vehicles, mobile base stations, or self-operating wireless
nodes present a great potential for deployment in next-generation
wireless networks. While current literature has been mainly fo-
cused on the use of agents within robotics or software engineering
applications, we propose a novel usage model for self-organizing
agents suited to wireless networks. In the proposed model, a
number of agents are required to collect data from several
arbitrarily located tasks. Each task represents a queue of packets
that require collection and subsequent wireless transmission by
the agents to a central receiver. The problem is modeled as a
hedonic coalition formation game between the agents and the
tasks that interact in order to form disjoint coalitions. Each
formed coalition is modeled as a polling system consisting of
a number of agents which move between the different tasks
present in the coalition, collect and transmit the packets. Within
each coalition, some agents can also take the role of a relay
for improving the packet success rate of the transmission. The
proposed algorithm allows the tasks and the agents to take
distributed decisions to join or leave a coalition, based on the
achieved benefit in terms of effective throughput, and the cost
in terms of delay. As a result of these decisions, the agents and
tasks structure themselves into independent disjoint coalitions
which constitute a Nash-stable network partition. Moreover, the
proposed algorithm allows the agents and tasks to adapt the
topology to environmental changes such as the arrival/removal of
tasks or the mobility of the tasks. Simulation results show how the
proposed algorithm allows the agents and tasks to self-organize
into independent coalitions, while improving the performance, in
terms of average player (agent or task) payoff, of at least 30.26%
(for a network of 5 agents with up to 25 tasks) relatively to a
scheme that allocates nearby tasks equally among agents.
Keywords: wireless networks, multiagent systems, game theory,
hedonic coalitions, task allocation, ad hoc networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Next generation wireless networks will present a highly
complex and dynamic environment characterized by a large
number of heterogeneous information sources, and a variety
of distributed network nodes. This is mainly due to the re-
cent emergence of large-scale, distributed, and heterogeneous
communication systems which are continuously increasing
in size, traffic, applications, services, etc. For maintaining a
satisfactory operation of such networks, there is a constant
need for dynamically optimizing their performance, moni-
toring their operation and reconfiguring their topology. Due
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to the ubiquitous nature of such wireless networks, it is
inherent to have self-organizing autonomous nodes (agents),
that can service these networks at different levels such as
data collection, monitoring, optimization, maintenance, and
others [1]–[6]. These nodes can be owned by the authority
maintaining the network, and must be able to survey large
scale networks, and perform very specific tasks at different
points in time, in an autonomous manner, with little reliance
on any centralized authority [1]–[6].
While the use of autonomous agents has been well investi-
gated in robotics, computer systems or software engineering,
research models tackling the use of such agents in wireless and
communication networks are few. However, recently, the need
for such agents in wireless networks has become of notice-
able importance as many next-generation networks encompass
several types of wireless devices, such as cognitive devices
or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), that are autonomous
and self-adapting [1]–[6]. A key challenge in this area is the
problem of task allocation among a group of agents that need
to execute a number of tasks. This problem has been already
tackled in areas such as robotics control [7]–[9] or software
systems [10], [11]. However, most of the existing models are
unsuitable for task allocation in wireless networks due to many
reasons: (i)- The task allocation problems studied in existing
work are tailored for military operations, computer systems,
or software engineering and, thus, cannot be readily applied
in models pertaining to wireless networks, (ii)- the tasks are
generally considered as static abstract entities with very simple
characteristics and no intelligence (e.g. the tasks are just points
in a plane) which is a major limitation, and (iii)- the existing
models do not consider any aspects of wireless networks
such as the characteristics of the wireless channel, the data
traffic, the need for wireless transmission, or other wireless-
specific specifications. In this context, numerous applications
in next-generation wireless networks require a number of
agent-nodes to perform specific wireless-related tasks that
emerge over time and are not pre-assigned. One example is
the case where a number of wireless nodes are required to
monitor the operation of the network or perform relaying
at different times and locations [1], [2], [4]–[6]. In such
applications, the objective is to develop algorithms enabling
the agents to autonomously share the tasks among each other.
The main existing contributions within wireless networking in
this area [12]–[16], are focused on deploying UAVs which can
act as self-deploying autonomous agents that can efficiently
perform pre-assigned tasks in applications such as connectivity
improvement in ad hoc network [13], routing [14], [15], and
medium access control [16]. However, these contributions
focus on centralized solutions for specific problems such as
finding the optimal locations for the deployment of UAVs
or devising efficient routing algorithms in ad hoc networks
2in the presence of UAVs. In these papers, the tasks that the
agents must accomplish are pre-assigned and pre-determined.
In contrast, many applications in wireless networks require the
agents to autonomously assign the tasks among themselves.
Hence, it is inherent to devise algorithms, in the context of
wireless networks, that allow an autonomous and distributed
task allocation process among a number of wireless agents1
with little reliance on centralized entities.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a novel
wireless-oriented model for the problem of task allocation
among a number of autonomous agents. The proposed model
considers a number of wireless agents that are required to
collect data from arbitrarily located tasks. Each task represents
a source of data, i.e., a queue with a Poisson arrival of packets,
that the agents must collect and transmit via a wireless link to a
central receiver. This formulation is deemed suitable to model
several problems in next-generation networks such as video
surveillance in wireless networks, self-deployment of mobile
relays in IEEE 802.16j networks [2], data collection in ad hoc
and sensor networks [6], operation of mobile base stations in
vehicular ad hoc networks [4] and mobile ad hoc networks [5]
(the so called message ferry operation), wireless monitoring
of randomly located sites, autonomous deployment of UAVs
in military ad hoc networks, and many other applications. For
allocating the tasks, we introduce a novel framework from
coalitional game theory, known as hedonic coalition formation.
Albeit hedonic games have been widely used in game theory,
to the best of our knowledge, no existing work utilized this
framework in a communication or wireless environment. Thus,
we model the task allocation problem as a hedonic coalition
formation game between the agents and the tasks, and we
introduce an algorithm for forming coalitions. Each formed
coalition is modeled as a polling system consisting of a number
of agents, designated as collectors, which act as a single
server that moves continuously between the different tasks
(queues) present in the coalition, gathering and transmitting
the collected packets to a common receiver. Further, within
each coalition, some agents can act as relays for improving
the packet success rate during the wireless transmission. For
forming coalitions, the agents and tasks can autonomously
make a decision to join or leave a coalition based on well
defined individual preference relations. These preferences are
based on a coalitional value function that takes into account the
benefits received from servicing a task, in terms of effective
throughput (data collected), as well as the cost in terms of
the polling system delay incurred from the time needed for
servicing all the tasks in a coalition. We study the properties
of the proposed algorithm, and show that it always converges
to a Nash-stable network partition. Further, we investigate
how the network topology can self-adapt to environmental
changes such as the deployment of new tasks, the removal
of existing tasks, and low mobility of the tasks. Simulation
results show how the proposed algorithm allows the network
to self-organize, while ensuring a performance improvement,
1The term wireless agent refers to any node that can act autonomously and
can perform wireless transmission. Examples of wireless agents are UAVs
[13], mobile base stations [4]–[6], cognitive wireless devices [3], or self-
deploying mobile relay stations [2].
in terms of average player (task or agent) payoff, compared to
a scheme that assigns nearby tasks equally among the agents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II presents and motivates the proposed system model. In
Section III, we model the task allocation problem problem as
a transferable utility coalitional game and propose a suited
utility function. In Section IV, we classify the task allocation
coalitional game as a hedonic coalition formation game, we
discuss its key properties and we introduce the algorithm
for coalition formation. Simulation results are presented, dis-
cussed, and analyzed in Section V. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a network having M wireless agents that belong
to a single network operator and that are controlled by a
central command center (e.g., a central controller node or
a satellite system). These agents are required to service T
tasks arbitrarily located in a geographic area that has an
associated central wireless receiver connected to the command
center. In general, the tasks are entities belonging to one or
more independent owners2. The owners of the tasks can be,
for example, service providers or third party operators. We
denote the set of agents and tasks by M = {1, . . . ,M},
and T = {1, . . . , T }, respectively. We consider only the case
where the number of tasks is larger than the number of agents,
hence, T > M . The main motivation behind this consideration
is that, for most networks, the number of agents assigned to a
specific area is generally small, e.g., due to cost factors. Each
task i ∈ T represents an M/D/1 queueing system3, whereby
packets of constant size B are generated using a Poisson
arrival with an average arrival rate of λi. Hence, we consider
different classes of tasks each having its corresponding λi.
The tasks we consider are sources of data that cannot send
their information to the central receiver (and, subsequently,
to the command center) without the help of an agent. These
tasks can represent a group of mobile devices, such as sensors,
video surveillance devices, or any other static or dynamic
wireless nodes that have limited power and are unable to
provide long-distance transmission. Such devices (tasks) need
to buffer their data locally and wait to be serviced by an agent
that can collect the data. For example, an agent such as a
mobile station or a UAV can provide a line-of-sight link to
facilitate the transmission from the tasks to the receiver. The
tasks can also be mapped to any other source of packet data
that require collection by an agent for transmission4. To service
a task, each agent is required to move to the task location,
collect the data, and transmit it using a wireless link to the
central receiver. The command center periodically downloads
this data from the receiver, e.g., through a backbone network.
Each agent i ∈ M offers a link transmission capacity of µi, in
packets/second, using which the agent can service the tasks’
data. The quantity 1
µi
thus represents the well-known service
time for a single packet that is being serviced by agent i. The
2The scenario where all tasks and agents are owned by the same entity is
a particular case of this generic model.
3Other queue types, e.g., M/M/1, can be considered without loss of
generality.
4The tasks can also be moving with a periodic low mobility.
3agent which is collecting the data from a task is referred to as
collector. In addition, each agent i ∈M can transmit the data
to the receiver with a maximum transmit power of Pi = P˜ ,
assumed the same for all agents with no loss of generality.
The proposed model allows each task to be serviced by
multiple agents, and also, each agent (or group of agents) to
service multiple tasks. Whenever a task is serviced by multiple
agents, each agent can act as either a collector or a relay. Any
group of agents that act together for data collection from the
same task, can be seen as a single collector with improved
link transmission capacity. In this paper, we consider that the
link transmission capacity depends solely on the capabilities
of the agents and not on the nature of the tasks. In this context,
given a group of agents G ⊆M that are acting as collectors
for any task, the total link transmission capacity with which
tasks can be serviced with by G can be given by
µG =
∑
j∈G
µj . (1)
For forming a single collector, multiple agents can easily
coordinate the data extraction and transmission from every
task, so as to allow a larger link transmission capacity for the
serviced task as in (1). The transmission of the packets by the
agents from a task i ∈ T to the central receiver is subject to
packet loss due to the fading on the wireless channel. Thus,
in addition to acting as collectors, some agents may act as
relays for a task. These relay-agents would locate themselves
at equal distances from the task (given that the task is already
being served by at least one collector), and, hence, the
collectors transmit the data to the receiver through multi-hop
agents, improving the probability of successful transmission.
In Rayleigh fading, the probability of successful transmission
of a packet of size B bits from the collectors present at a task
i ∈ T through a path of m agents, Qi = {i1, . . . , im}, where
i1 = i is the task being serviced, im is the central receiver,
and any other ih ∈ Qi is a relay-agent, is given by
Pri,CR =
m−1∏
h=1
PrBih,ih+1 , (2)
where Prih,ih+1 is the the probability of successful transmis-
sion of a single bit from agent ih to agent (or the central
receiver) ih+1. This probability can be given by the probability
of maintaining the SNR at the receiver above a target level ν0
as follows [17]
Pri,ih+1 = exp
(
−
σ2ν0(Dih,ih+1)
α
κP˜
)
, (3)
where σ2 is the variance of the Gaussian noise, κ is a path loss
constant, α is the path loss exponent, Dih,ih+1 is the distance
between nodes ih and ih+1, and P˜ is the maximum transmit
power of agent ih.
For servicing a number of tasks C ⊆ T , a group of agents
G ⊆ M (collectors and relays) can sequentially move from
one task to the other in C with a constant velocity η. The group
G of agents, servicing the tasks in C, stop at each task, with
the collectors collecting and transmitting the packets using the
relays (if any). The collectors would move from one task to
Fig. 1. An illustrative example of the proposed model for task allocation in
wireless networks (the agents are dynamic, i.e., they move from one task to
the other continuously).
the other, only if all the packets in the queue at the current
task have been transmitted to the receiver (the process through
which the agents move from one task to the other for data
collection is cyclic). Simultaneously with the collectors, the
relays also move, positioning themselves at equal distances
on the line connecting the task being currently served by the
collectors, and the central receiver. With this proposed model,
the final network will consist of groups of tasks serviced by
groups of agents, continuously. An illustration of this model is
shown in Fig. 1. Given this proposed model, the main objective
is to provide an algorithm for distributing the tasks between the
agents, given the operation of the agents previously described
and shown in Fig. 1.
III. COALITIONAL GAME FORMULATION
A. Game Formulation
By inspecting Fig. 1, one can clearly see that the task
allocation problem among the agents can be mapped into
the problem of the formation of coalitions. In this regard,
coalitional game theory [18, Ch. 9] provides a suitable an-
alytical tool for studying the formation of cooperative groups,
i.e., coalitions, among a number of players. For the proposed
model, the coalitional game is played between the agents
and the tasks. Hence, the players set for the proposed task
allocation coalitional game is denoted by N , and contains both
agents and tasks, i.e., N = M∪ T . Hereinafter, we use the
term player to indicate either a task or an agent.
For any coalition S ⊆ N containing a number of agents
and tasks, the agents belonging to this coalition can struc-
ture themselves into collectors and relays. Subsequently, as
explained in the previous section, within each coalition, the
collector-agents will continuously move from one task to the
other, stopping at each task, and transmitting all the packets
available in the queue to the central receiver, through the
relay-agents (if any). This proposed task servicing scheme
can be mapped to a well-known concept that is ubiquitous
in computer systems, which is the concept of a polling system
[19]. In a polling system, a single server moves between
multiple queues in order to extract the packets from each
queue, in a sequential and cyclic manner. Models pertaining
4to polling systems have been widely developed in various
disciplines ranging from computer systems to communication
networks, and different strategies for servicing the queues
exist [19]–[21]. In the proposed model, the collectors of every
coalition are considered as a single server that is servicing
the tasks (queues) sequentially, in a cyclic manner, i.e., after
servicing the last task in a coalition S ⊆ N , the collectors of
S return to the first task in S that they previously visited hence
repeating their route continuously. Whenever the collectors
stop at any task i ∈ S, they collect and transmit the data
present at this task until the queue is empty. This method of
allowing the server to service a queue until emptying the queue
is known as the exhaustive strategy for a polling system, which
is applied at the level of every coalition S ⊆ N in our model.
Moreover, the time for the server to move from one queue to
the other is known as the switchover time. Consequently, we
highlight the following property:
Property 1: In the proposed task allocation model, every
coalition S ⊆ N is a polling system with an exhaustive polling
strategy and deterministic non-zero switchover times. In each
such polling system S, the collector-agents are seen as the
polling system server, and the tasks are the queues that the
collector-agents must service.
For any coalition S, once the queue at a task i ∈ S is
emptied, the collectors and relays in a coalition move from task
i to the next task j ∈ S with a constant velocity η, incurring
a switchover time θi,j . The switchover time in our model
corresponds to the time it takes for all the agents (collectors
and relays) to move from one task to the next. Assuming all
agents start their mobility at the same time, this switchover
time maps to the time needed for the farthest agent to move
from one task to the next. Since we consider only straight line
trajectories for collectors and relays, and due to the fact that
the relays always position themselves at equal distances on the
line connecting the tasks in a coalition to the receiver, we have
the following property (clearly seen through the geometry of
Fig. 1).
Property 2: Within any given coalition S, the switchover
time between two tasks corresponds to the constant time it
takes for one of the collectors to move from one of the tasks
to the next.
Having modeled every coalition S ⊆ N as a polling system,
we investigate the average delay incurred per coalition. For
polling systems, finding exact expressions for the delay at
every queue is a highly complicated task and no general
closed-form expressions for the delay at every queue in a
polling system can be found [19], [20]5. A key criterion used
for the analysis of the delay incurred by a polling system is
the pseudo-conservation law that provides closed-form expres-
sions for weighted sum of the means of the waiting times at
the queues [19], [20]. For providing the pseudo-conservation
law for a coalition S ⊆ N composed of a number of agents
and a number of tasks, we make the following definitions.
First, within coalition S, a group of agents GS ⊆ S ∩ M
are designated as collectors. Second, for each task i ∈ S ∩ T
5Note that some approximations [20] exist for polling systems under heavy
traffic or large switchover times, but in our problem, they are not suitable as
we require a more general delay expression.
with an average arrival rate of λi, and served by a number
of collectors |GS | with a link transmission capacity of µGS
(as given by (1)), we define the utilization factor of task i
ρi =
λi
µGS
. Further, we define ρS ,
∑
i∈S∩T ρi. Given these
definitions, for a coalition S, the weighted sum of the means
of the waiting times by the agents at all the tasks in the
coalition are given by the pseudo-conservation law as follows
[20, Section. VI-B] (taking into account that our switchover
and service times are deterministic)∑
i∈S∩T
ρiW¯i = ρS
∑
i∈S∩T
ρi
µGS
2(1− ρS)
+ ρS
θ2S
2
(4)
+
θS
2(1− ρS)
[
ρ2S −
∑
i∈S∩T
ρ2i
]
,
where W¯i is the mean waiting time at task i and θS =∑|S∩T |
h=1 θih,ih+1 is the sum of the switchover times given a
path of tasks {i1, . . . , i|S∩T |} followed by the agents, with
ih ∈ S ∩ T , ∀ h ∈ {1, . . . , |S ∩ T |} and i|S∩T |+1 = i1.
The first term in the right hand side of (4) is the well known
expression for the average queueing delay for M/D/1 queues,
weighed by ρS . The second and third terms in the right hand
side of (4) represent the average delay increase incurred by the
travel time required for the collectors to move from one task to
the other, i.e., the delay resulting from the switchover period.
Further, for any coalition S that must form in the system, the
following condition must hold:
ρS < 1. (5)
This condition is a requirement for the stability of any polling
system [19]–[21] and, thus, must be satisfied for any coalition
that will form in the proposed model. In the event where this
condition is violated, the system is considered unstable and
the delay is considered as infinite. In this regard, the analysis
presented in the remainder of this paper will take into account
this condition and its impact on the coalition formation process
(as seen later, a coalition where ρS ≥ 1 will never form).
B. Utility Function
In the proposed game, for every coalition S ⊆ N , the agents
must determine the order in which the tasks in S are visited,
i.e., the path {i1, . . . , i|S∩T |} which is an ordering over the
set of tasks in S given by S ∩ T . Naturally, the agents must
select the path that minimizes the total switchover time for one
round of data collection. This can be mapped to the following
well-known problem:
Property 3: The problem of finding the path that mini-
mizes the total switchover time for one round of data collection
within a coalition S ⊆ N is mapped into the traveling
salesman problem [22], where a salesman, i.e., the agents
S ∩M, is required to minimize the time of visiting a series
of cities, i.e., the tasks S ∩ T .
It is widely known that the solution for the traveling
salesman problem is NP-complete [22], and, hence, there has
been numerous heuristic algorithms for finding an acceptable
near-optimal solution. One of the simplest of such algorithms
is the nearest neighbor algorithm (also known as the greedy
algorithm) [22]. In this algorithm, starting from a given city
the salesman chooses the closet city as his next visit. Using
5the nearest neighbor algorithm, the ordering of the cities which
minimizes the overall route is selected. The nearest neighbor
algorithm is sub-optimal but it can quickly find a near-optimal
solution with a small computational complexity (linear in the
number of cities) [22] which makes it suitable for problems
such as the proposed task allocation problem. Therefore, in the
proposed model, for every coalition S, the agents can easily
work out the nearest neighbor route for the tasks, and operate
according to it.
Having modeled each coalition as a polling system, the
pseudo-conservation law in (4) allows to evaluate the cost,
in terms of average waiting time (or delay), from forming a
particular coalition. However, for every coalition, there is a
benefit, in terms of the average effective throughput that the
coalition is able to achieve. The average effective throughput
for a coalition S is given by
LS =
∑
i∈S∩T
λi · Pri,CR, (6)
with Pri,CR given by (2). By closely inspecting (1), one can
see that adding more collectors improves the transmission link
capacity, and, thus, reduces the service time that a certain task
perceives. Based on this property and by using (4) one can
easily see that, adding more collectors, i.e., improving the
service time, reduces the overall delay in (4) [19]–[21]. Fur-
ther, adding more relays would reduce the distance over which
transmission is occurring, thus, improving the probability of
successful transmission as per (2) [4], [17]. In consequence,
using (6), one can see that this improvement in the probability
of successful transmission is translated into an improvement
in the effective throughput. Hence, each agent role (collector
or relay) possesses its own benefit for a coalition.
A suitable criterion for characterizing the utility in networks
that exhibit a tradeoff between the throughput and the delay
is the concept of system power which is defined as the
ratio of some power of the throughput and the delay (or a
power of the delay) [23]. Hence, the concept of power is
an attractive notion that allows to capture the fundamental
tradeoff between throughput and delay in the proposed task
allocation model. Power has been used thoroughly in the
literature in applications that are sensitive to throughput as well
as delay [24]–[26]. Mainly, for the proposed game, the utility
of every coalition S is evaluated using a coalitional value
function based on the power concept from [26] as follows
v(S) =

δ
L
β
S
(
∑
i∈S∩T
ρiW¯i)(1−β)
, if ρS < 1 and |S| > 1,
0, otherwise,
(7)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a throughput-delay tradeoff parameter. In
(7), the term δ represents the price per unit power that the
network offers to coalition S. Hence, δ represents a generic
control parameter that allows the network operator to somehow
monitor the behavior of the players. The use of such control
parameters is prevalent in game theory [27]–[31]. In certain
scenarios, δ would represent physical monetary values paid
by the operator to the different entities (agents and tasks). In
such a case, on one hand, for the tasks, the operator simply
would pay the tasks’ owners for the amount of data (and its
corresponding quality as per (7)) each one of their tasks had
generated. On the other hand, for the agents, the payment
would, for example, represent either a reward for the behavior
of the agents or the proportion of maintenance or servicing
that each agent would receiver from its operator. In this sense,
the utility function in (7) would, thus, represents the total
revenue achieved by a coalition S, given the network power
that coalition S obtains. For coalitions that consist of a single
agent or a single task, i.e., coalitions of size 1, the utility
assigned is 0 due to the fact that such coalitions generate no
benefit for their member (a single agent can collect no data
unless it moves to task, while a single task cannot transmit any
of its generated data without an agent collecting this data).
Further, any coalition where condition (5) is not satisfied is
also given a zero utility, since, in this case, the polling system
that the coalition represents is unstable, and hence has an
infinite delay.
Given the set of players N , and the value function in
(7), we define a coalitional game (N , v) with transferable
utility (TU). The utility in (7) represents the amount of money
or revenue received by a coalition, and, hence, this amount
can be arbitrarily apportioned between the coalition members,
which justifies the TU nature of the game. To divide this utility
between the players, we adopt the equal fair allocation rule,
where the payoff of any player i ∈ S, denoted by xSi is
xSi =
v(S)
|S|
. (8)
The payoff xSi represents the amount of revenue that player
i ∈ S receives from the total revenue v(S) that coalition S
generates. The main motivation behind adopting the equal fair
allocation rule is in order to highlight the fact that the agents
and the tasks value each others equally. As seen in (7), the
presence of an agent in a coalition is crucial in order for the
tasks to obtain any payoff, and, vice versa, the presence of
a task in a coalition is required for the agent to be able to
obtain any kind of utility. Nonetheless, the proposed model
and algorithm can accommodate any other type of payoff
allocation rule. Although in traditional coalitional games, the
allocation rule may have a strong impact on the game’s
solution, for the proposed game, other allocation rules can be
used with little impact on the analysis that is presented in the
rest of the paper. This is due to the class of the proposed game
which is quite different from traditional coalitional games. As
seen from (4) and (7), whenever the number of tasks in a
coalition increases, the total delay increases, hence, reducing
the utility from forming a coalition. Further, in a coalition
where the number of tasks is large, the condition of stability
for the polling system, as given by (5), can be violated due to
heavy traffic incoming from a large number of tasks yielding
a zero utility as per (7). Hence, forming coalitions between
the tasks and the agents entails a cost that can limit the size
of a coalition. In this regard, traditional solution concepts for
TU games, such as the core [18], may not be applicable. In
fact, in order for the core to exist, a TU coalitional game must
ensure that the grand coalition, i.e., the coalition of all players
will form. However, as seen in Fig. 1 and corroborated by the
utility in (7), in general, due to the cost for coalition formation,
6the grand coalition will not form. Instead, independent and
disjoint coalitions appear in the network as a result of the
task allocation process. In this regard, the proposed game
is classified as a coalition formation game [27]–[31], and
the objective is to find an algorithm that allows to form the
coalition structure, instead of finding only a solution concept,
such as the core, which aims mainly at stabilizing a grand
coalition of all players.
IV. TASK ALLOCATION AS A HEDONIC COALITION
FORMATION GAME
A. Hedonic Coalition Formation: Concepts and Model
Coalition formation games have been a topic of high interest
in game theory [27]–[31]. Notably, in [29]–[31], a class
of coalition formation games known as hedonic coalition
formation games is investigated. This class of games entails
several interesting properties that can be applied, not only in
economics such as in [29]–[31], but also in wireless networks
as we will demonstrate in this paper. The two key requirements
for classifying a coalitional game as a hedonic game are [29]:
Condition 1: - (Hedonic Conditions) - A coalition forma-
tion game is classified as hedonic if
1) The payoff of any player depends solely on the members
of the coalition to which the player belongs.
2) The coalitions form as a result of the preferences of the
players over their possible coalitions’ set.
These two conditions characterize the framework of hedonic
games. Mainly, the term hedonic pertains to the first condition
above, whereby the payoff of any player i, in a hedonic game,
must depend only on the identity of the players in the coalition
to which player i belongs, with no dependence on the other
players. For the second condition, in the remainder of this
section, we will formally define how the preferences of the
players over the coalitions can be used for the formation
process. To use hedonic games in the proposed model, we
first introduce some definitions, taken from [29].
Definition 1: A coalition structure or a coalition partition
is defined as the set Π = {S1, . . . , Sl} which partitions the
players set N , i.e., ∀ k , Sk ⊆ N are disjoint coalitions such
that ∪lk=1Sk = N (an example partition Π is shown in Fig. 1).
Definition 2: Given a partition Π of N , for every player
i ∈ N we denote by SΠ(i), the coalition to which player i
belongs, i.e., coalition SΠ(i) = Sk ∈ Π, such that i ∈ Sk.
In a hedonic game, each player must build preferences over
its own set of possible coalitions. Hence, each player must
be able to compare the coalitions and order them based on
which coalition prefers being a member of. To evaluate these
players’ preferences over the coalitions, we define the concept
of a preference relation or order as follows [29]:
Definition 3: For any player i ∈ N , a preference relation
or order i is defined as a complete, reflexive, and transitive
binary relation over the set of all coalitions that player i can
possibly form, i.e., the set {Sk ⊆ N : i ∈ Sk}.
Thus, for a player i ∈ N , given two coalitions S1 ⊆ N
and, S2 ⊆ N such that i ∈ S1 and i ∈ S2, S1 i S2 indicates
that player i prefers to be part of coalition S1, over being part
of coalition S2, or at least, i prefers both coalitions equally.
Further, using the asymmetric counterpart of i, denoted by
≻i, then S1 ≻i S2, indicates that player i strictly prefers
being a member of S1 over being a member of S2. For
every application, an adequate preference relation i can be
defined to allow the players to quantify their preferences. The
preference relation can be a function of many parameters, such
as the payoffs that the players receive from each coalition, the
weight each player gives to other players, and so on. Given
the set of players N , and a preference relation i for every
player i ∈ N , a hedonic coalition formation game is formally
defined as follows [29]:
Definition 4: A hedonic coalition formation game is a
coalitional game that satisfies the two hedonic conditions
previously prescribed, and is defined by the pair (N ,≻) where
N is the set of players (|N | = N ), and ≻ is a profile of
preferences, i.e., preference relations, (1, . . . ,N ) defined
for every player in N .
Having defined the main components of hedonic coalition
formation games, we utilize this framework in order to provide
a suitable solution for the task allocation problem proposed in
Section II. The proposed task allocation problem is modeled as
a (N ,≻) hedonic game, where N is the set of agents and tasks
and ≻ is a profile of preferences that we will shortly define.
For the proposed game model, given a network partition Π of
N , the payoff of any player i, depends only on the identity
of the members of the coalition to which i belongs. In other
words, the payoff of any player i depends solely on the players
in the coalition in which player i belongs SΠ(i) (easily seen
through the formulation of Section III). Hence, our game
verifies the first hedonic condition.
Moreover, to model the task allocation problem as a hedonic
coalition formation game, the preference relations of the
players must be clearly defined. In this regard, we define two
types of preference relations, a first type suited for indicating
the preferences of the agents, and a second type suited for
the tasks. Subsequently, for evaluating the preferences of
any agent i ∈ M, we define the following operation (this
preference relation is common for all agents, hence we denote
it by i = M, ∀i ∈ M)
S2 M S1 ⇔ ui(S2) ≥ ui(S1), (9)
where S1 ⊆ N and S2 ⊆ N are any two coalitions that
contain agent i, i.e., i ∈ S1 and i ∈ S2 and ui : 2N → R is a
preference function defined for any agent i as follows
ui(S) =


∞, if S = SΠ(i) & S \ {i} ⊆ T ,
0, if S ∈ h(i),
xSi . otherwise,
(10)
where Π is the current coalition partition which is in place
in the game, xSi is the payoff received by player i from any
division of the value function among the players in coalition
S such as the equal fair division given in (8), and h(i) is the
history set of player i. At any point in time, the history set
h(i) is a set that contains the coalitions that player i was a part
of in the past, prior to the formation of the current partition Π.
Note that, by using the defined preference relation, the players
7can compare any two coalitions S1 and S2 independently of
whether these two coalitions belong to Π or not.
The main rationale behind the preference function ui in
(10) is as follows. In this model, the agents, being entities
owned by the operator, seek out to achieve two conflicting
objectives: (i)- Service all tasks in the network for the benefit
of the operator, and (ii)- Maximize the quality of service, in
terms of power as per (7), for extracting the data from the
tasks. The preference function ui must be able to allow the
agents to make coalition formation decisions that can capture
this tradeoff between servicing all tasks (at the benefit of
the operator) and achieving a good quality of service (at the
benefit of both agents and operator). For this purpose, as per
(10), any agent i that is the sole agent servicing tasks in its
current coalition S = SΠ(i) such that SΠ(i) ∩ M = {i},
assigns an infinite preference value to S. Hence, in order
to service all tasks, the agent always assigns a maximum
preference to its current coalition, if this current coalition is
composed of only tasks and does not contain other agents.
This case of the preference function ui forbids the agent from
leaving a group of tasks, already assigned to it, unattended
by other agents. In this context, this condition pertains to
the fist objective (objective (i) previously mentioned) of the
agents and it implies that, whenever there is a risk of leaving
tasks without service, the agent do not act selfishly, in contrast,
they act in the benefit of the operator and remain with these
tasks, independent of the payoff generated by these tasks. Such
a decision allows an agent to avoid making a decision that
can incur a risk of ultimately having tasks with no service
in the network, in which case, the network operator would
lose revenue from these unattended tasks and it may, for
example, decide to replace the agent that led to the presence of
such a group of tasks with no service. Otherwise, the agents’
preference relation ui would highlight the second objective of
the agent, i.e., maximize its own payoff which maps into the
revenue generated from the quality of service, i.e., the power
as per (7). with which the tasks are being serviced. In this
case, the preference relation is easily generated by the agents
by comparing the value of the payoffs they receive from the
two coalitions S1 and S2. Further, we note that no agent has
any incentive to revisit a coalition that it had left previously,
and hence, the agents assign a preference value of 0 for any
coalition in their history (this can be seen as a basic learning
process). In summary, taking into account the conflicting goals
of the agents, between two coalitions S1 and S2, an agent i
prefers the coalition that gives the better payoff, given that
the agent is not alone in its current coalition, and the coalition
with a better payoff is not in the history of agent i.
To evaluate the preferences of any task j ∈ T , we define
the following operation (this preference relation is common
for all tasks, hence, we denote it by j = T , ∀j ∈ T )
S2 T S1 ⇔ wj(S2) ≥ wj(S1), (11)
with the tasks’ preference function wj defined as follows.
wj(S) =
{
0, if S ∈ h(j),
xSj , otherwise.
(12)
The preferences of the tasks are easily captured using the
function wj . The preference function of the tasks is differ-
ent from that of the agents since the tasks are, in general,
independent entities that act solely in their own interest. Thus,
based on (12), each task prefers the coalition that provides
the larger payoff xSj unless this coalition was already visited
previously and left. In that case, the preference function of
the tasks assigns a preference value of 0 for any coalition
that the task had already visited in the past (and left to join
another coalition). Using this preference relation, every task
can evaluate its preferences over the possible coalitions that
the task can form. Consequently, the proposed task allocation
model verifies both hedonic conditions, and, hence, we have:
Property 4: The proposed task allocation problem among
the agents is modeled as a (N ,≻) hedonic coalition formation
game, with the preference relations given by (9) and (11).
Note that the preference relations in (9) and (11) are also
dependent on the underlying TU coalitional game described in
Section III. Having formulated the problem as a hedonic game,
the final task is to provide a distributed algorithm, based on the
defined preferences, for forming the coalitions. However, prior
to deriving the algorithm for coalition formation, we highlight
the following result:
Proposition 1: For the proposed hedonic coalition forma-
tion model for task allocation, assuming that all collector-
agents have an equal link transmission capacity µi = µ, ∀i ∈
M, any coalition S ⊆ N with |S ∩M| agents, must have at
least |GS |min collector-agents (GS ⊆ S ∩M) as follows
|GS | > |GS |min =
∑
i∈S∩T λi
µ
. (13)
Further, when all the tasks in S belong to the same class, we
have
|GS |min =
|S ∩ T | · λ
µ
, (14)
which constitutes an upper bound on the number of collector-
agents as a function of the number of tasks |S∩T | for a given
coalition S.
Proof: As per the defined preference relations in (10) and
(12), any coalition that will form in the proposed model must
be stable since no agent or task has an incentive to join an
unstable coalition, hence, we have, for every coalition S ⊆ N
having |GS | collectors with GS ⊆ S ∩M, we have from (5)
ρS < 1, and thus ∑
i∈S∩T
λi
µGS
< 1,
which, given the assumption that µi = µ, ∀i ∈ M yields
1
|GS | · µ
·
∑
i∈S∩T
λi < 1,
which yields |GS | > |GS |min =
∑
i∈S∩T
λi
µ
. Further, if we
assume that all the tasks belong to the same class, hence,
λi = λ, ∀i ∈ S ∩ T , we immediately get
|GS |min =
|S ∩ T | · λ
µ
. (15)
8Consequently, for any proposed coalition formation algorithm,
the bounds on the number of collector-agents in any coalition
S as given by Proposition 1 will always be satisfied.
B. Hedonic Coalition Formation: Algorithm
In the previous subsection, we modeled the task allocation
problem as a hedonic coalition formation game and, thus, the
remaining objective is to devise an algorithm for forming the
coalitions. While literature that studies the characteristics of
existing partitions in hedonic games, such as in [29]–[31],
is abundant, the problem of forming the coalitions both in
the hedonic and non-hedonic setting is a challenging problem
[27]. In this paper, we introduce an algorithm for coalition
formation that allows the players to make selfish decisions as
to which coalitions they decide to join at any point in time. In
this regard, for forming coalitions between the tasks and the
agents, we propose the following rule for coalition formation:
Definition 5: Switch Rule - Given a partition Π =
{S1, . . . , Sl} of the set of players (agents and tasks) N , a
Player i decides to leave its current coalition SΠ(i) = Sm,
for some m ∈ {1, . . . , l} and join another coalition Sk ∈
Π ∪ {∅}, Sk 6= SΠ(i), if and only if Sk ∪ {i} ≻i SΠ(i).
Hence, {Sm, Sk} → {Sm \ {i}, Sk ∪ {i}}.
Through a single switch rule made by any player i, any
current partition Π of N is transformed into Π′ = (Π \
{Sm, Sk})∪ {Sm \ {i}, Sk ∪ {i}}. In simple terms, for every
partition Π, the switch rule provides a mechanism through
which any task or agent, can leave its current coalition SΠ(i),
and join another coalition Sk ∈ Π, given that the new
coalition Sk ∪ {i} is strictly preferred over SΠ(i) through
any preference relation that i is using (in particular using
the preference relations defined in (9) and (11)). Independent
of the preference relations selected, the switch rule can be
seen as a selfish decision made by a player, to move from its
current coalition to a new coalition, regardless of the effect
of this move on the other players. Furthermore, we consider
that, whenever a player decides to switch from one coalition
to another, the player updates its history set h(i). Hence,
given a partition Π, whenever a player i decides to leave
coalition Sm ∈ Π to join a different coalition, coalition Sm is
automatically stored by player i in its history set h(i).
Consequently, we propose a coalition formation algorithm
composed of three main phases: Task discovery, hedonic
coalition formation, and data collection. In the first phase,
the central command receives information about the existence
of tasks that require servicing and informs the agents of the
locations and characteristics of the tasks (e.g., the arrival
rates). Hence, the agents start by having full knowledge of
the initial partition Πinitial. Once the agents are aware of
the tasks, they broadcast their own presence to the tasks.
Consequently, the players can interact with each other, for
performing coalition formation. Hence, the second phase of
the algorithm is the hedonic coalition formation phase. In
this phase, all the players (tasks and agents) investigate the
possibility of performing a switch operation. For identifying
potential switch operations, given complete knowledge about
the network (which can be gathered in different methods as
will be discussed in Subsection IV-C)), each agent investigates
its top preference, and decides to perform a switch operation,
if possible through (9). As one can easily see in (7), for the
proposed model, no coalition composed of tasks-only would
ever form since such a coalition would always generate a 0
utility. Therefore, the tasks are only interested in switching to
coalitions that contain at least a single agent. From a tasks’
perspective, for determining its preferred switch operation,
each task needs only to negotiate with existing agents in order
to enquire on the amount of utility it can obtain by joining
with this agent. By doing so, each task can determine the
switch operation it is interested in making at a given time. We
consider that, the players make sequential switch decisions
(the order of switch operations is referred to as the order of
play hereinafter). For any agent, a switch operation is easily
performed as the agent can leave its current coalition and join
the new coalition, if (9) is satisfied. For the tasks, any task that
finds out a possibility to switch, can autonomously request,
over a control channel with the concerned agent, to be added
to the coalition of interest (which would always contain at
least one agent with whom the task previously negotiated).
The convergence of the proposed algorithm during the hedonic
coalition formation phase is guaranteed as follows:
Theorem 1: Starting from any initial network partition
Πinitial, the proposed hedonic coalition formation phase of
the proposed algorithm always converges to a final network
partition Πf composed of a number of disjoint coalitions.
Proof: For the purpose of this proof, we denote Πknk as the
partition formed during the time k when player i ∈ N decides
to act after nk switch operations have previously occurred (the
index nk denotes the number of switch operations performed
by one or more players up to time k). Given any initial
starting partition Πinitial = Π10, the hedonic coalition formation
phase of the proposed algorithm consists of a sequence of
switch operations. As per Definition 5, every switch operation
transforms the current partition Π into another partition Π′,
hence, hedonic coalition formation consists of a sequence of
switch rules, yielding, e.g., the following transformations
Π10 = Π
2
0 → Π
3
1 → . . .→ Π
L
nL
. . .→ . . .→ ΠTnT , (16)
where the operator → indicate the occurrence of a switch
operation. In other words, Πknk → Π
k+1
nk+1
, implies that during
turn k, a certain player i made a single switch operation which
yielded a new partition Πk+1nk+1 at the turn k+1. By inspecting
the preference relations defined in (9) and (11), it can be seen
that every single switch operation leads to a partition that
has not yet been visited (new partition). Hence, for any two
partitions Πknk and Π
l
nl
in the transformations of (16), such
that nk 6= nl, i.e., Πlnl is a result of the transformation of Π
k
nk(or vice versa) after a number of switch operations |nl − nk|,
we have that Πknk 6= Π
l
nl
for any two turns k and l.
Given this property and the well known fact that the number
of partitions of a set is finite and given by the Bell number [27],
the number of transformations in (16) is finite, and, hence, the
sequence in (16) will always terminate and converge to a final
partition Πf = ΠTnT which completes the proof.
The stability of the final partition Πf resulting from the
convergence of the proposed algorithm can be studied using
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THE PROPOSED HEDONIC COALITION FORMATION ALGORITHM FOR TASK
ALLOCATION IN WIRELESS NETWORKS.
Initial State
The network is partitioned by Πinitial = {S1, . . . , Sk}. At the beginning
of all time Πinitial = N = M∪ T with no tasks being serviced.
Three Phases for the Proposed Hedonic Coalition Formation Algorithm
Phase I - Task Discovery:
a) The command center is informed by one or multiple owners about the
existence and characteristics of new tasks.
b) The central command center conveys the information on the initial network
partition Πinitial using the methods of Subsection IV-C
Phase II - Hedonic Coalition Formation:
repeat
For every player i ∈ N , given a current partition Πcurrent .
a) Player i investigates possible switch using the preferences
given, respectively, by (9) and (11) for the agents and tasks.
b) Player i performs the switch operation that maximizes its payoff:
b.1) Player i updates its history h(i) by adding SΠcurrent(i).
b.2) Player i leaves its current coalition SΠcurrent(i).
b.3) Player i joins the new coalition that maximizes its payoff.
until convergence to a final Nash-stable partition Πf .
Phase III - Data Collection
a) The network is partitioned using Πfinal .
b) The agents in each coalition Sk ∈ Πfinal continuously perform the
following operations, i.e., act as a polling system with exhaustive strategy
and switchover times:
b.1) Visit a first task in their respective coalitions.
b.2) The collector-agents collect the data from the task being visited.
b.3) The collector-agents transmit the data using wireless links to the
central receiver either directly or using other relay-agents.
b.4) Once the queue of the current is empty, visit the next task.
The order in which the tasks are visited is determined by the nearest
neighbor solution to the traveling salesman problem as in Property 3.
This third phase is continuously repeated and performed by all the agents
in Πfinal for a fixed period of time Ψ (for static environments Ψ =∞).
Adaptation to environmental changes (periodic process)
a) In the presence of environmental changes, such as the deployment of
new tasks, the removal of existing tasks, or periodic low mobility of
the tasks, the third phase of the algorithm is performed continuously
only for a fixed period of time Ψ.
b) After Ψ elapses, the first two phases are repeated to allow the players
to self-organize and adapt the network to these environmental changes.
c) This process is repeated periodically for networks where environmental
changes may occur.
the following stability concept from hedonic games [29]:
Definition 6: A partition Π = {S1, . . . , Sl} is Nash-stable
if ∀i ∈ N , SΠ(i) i Sk∪{i} for all Sk ∈ Π∪{∅} (for agents
i=M, ∀i ∈ N ∩M and for tasks i=T , ∀i ∈ N ∩ T ).
In other words, a coalition partition Π is Nash-stable, if no
player has an incentive to move from its current coalition to
another coalition in Π or to deviate and act alone. Furthermore,
a Nash-stable partition Π implies that there does not exist any
coalition Sk ∈ N such that a player i strictly prefers to be
part of Sk over being part of its current coalitions, while all
players of Sk do not get hurt by forming Sk ∪ {i}. This is
the concept of individual stability, which is formally defined
as follows [29]:
Definition 7: A partition Π = {S1, . . . , Sl} is individually
stable if there do not exist i ∈ N , and a coalition Sk ∈ Π∪{∅}
such that Sk ∪ {i} ≻i SΠ(i) and Sk ∪ {i} j Sk for all
j ∈ Sk (for agents i=M, ∀i ∈ N ∩ M and for tasks
i=T , ∀i ∈ N ∩ T for tasks).
As already noted, a Nash-stable partition is individually stable
[29]. For the hedonic coalition formation phase of the proposed
algorithm, we have the following:
Proposition 2: Any partition Πf resulting from the hedo-
nic coalition formation phase of the proposed algorithm is
Nash-stable, and, hence, individually stable.
Proof: For any partition Π, no player (agent or task)
i ∈ N has an incentive to leave its current coalition, and
act alone as per the utility function in (7). Assume that the
partition Πf resulting from the proposed algorithm is not
Nash-stable. Hence, there exists a player i ∈ N , and a
coalition Sk ∈ Πf such that Sk ∪ {i} ≻i SΠf (i), hence,
player i can perform a switch operation which contradicts
with the fact that Πf is the result of the convergence of
the proposed algorithm (Theorem 1). Thus, any partition Πf
resulting from the hedonic coalition formation phase of the
proposed algorithm is Nash-stable, and, hence, by [29], this
resulting partition is also individually stable.
Following the formation of the coalitions and the convergence
of the hedonic coalition formation phase to a Nash-stable
partition, the last phase of the algorithm entails the actual data
collection by the agents. In this phase, the agents move from
one task to the other, in their respective coalitions, collecting
the data and transmitting it to the central receiver, similar to a
polling system, as explained in Sections II and III. A summary
of the proposed algorithm is shown in Table I.
The proposed algorithm, as highlighted in Table I, can adapt
the network topology to environmental changes such as the
deployment of new tasks, the removal of a number of existing
tasks, or a periodic low mobility of the tasks (in the case
where the tasks represent mobile sensor devices for example).
For this purpose, the first two phases of the algorithm shown
in Table I are repeated periodically over time, to adapt to
any changes that occurred in the environment. With regards
to mobility, we only consider the cases where the tasks are
mobile for a fixed period of time with a velocity that is smaller
than that of the agents η. In the presence of such a mobile
environment, the central command center, through Phase I
of the algorithm in Table I informs the agents of the new
tasks locations (periodically) and, thus, during Phase II of the
proposed algorithm, both agents and tasks can react to the
environment changes, and modify the existing topology. As
per Theorem 1 and Proposition 2, regardless of the starting
position, the players will always self-organize into a Nash-
stable partition, even after mobility, the deployment of new
tasks or the removal of existing tasks. In summary, in a
changing environment, the first two phases of the algorithm in
Table I are repeated periodically, after a certain fixed period
of time Ψ has elapsed during which the players were involved
in Phase III and the actual data collection and transmission
occurred. Finally, whenever a changing environment is con-
sidered, the players are also allowed to periodically clear their
history, so as to allow them to explore all the new possibilities
that the changes in the environment may have yielded.
C. Distributed Implementation Possibilities
For implementation, as shown in Fig. 1, we clearly distin-
guish between two inherently different entities: The command
center, which is the intelligence that has some control over the
agents and the central receiver which is a node in the network
that is connected to the command center and which would
receive the data transmitted by the agents (this distinction can
be, for example, analogous to the distinction between a radio
network controller and a base station in cellular networks). In
practice, the central command can be, for example, a node
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that owns a number of agents and controls a large area which
is divided into smaller areas with each area represented by
the illustration of Fig. 1. Hence, each such small area is a
region having its own central receiver and where a subset of
agents needs to operate and perform coalition formation using
our model. In other scenarios, the command center can also
be a satellite system that controls groups of agents with each
group deployed in a different area (notably when the agents are
UAVs for example). In contrast, the central receiver is simply
a wireless node that receives the data from the agents and,
subsequently, the command center can obtain this data from
all receivers in its controlled area (e.g., through a backbone)6.
For performing coalition formation, the agents and tasks
are required to know different types of information. In order
to perform a switch operation, each agent is required to obtain
data on the location of the tasks (hence, consequently deducing
the hop distance Dij between any two tasks i and j) as well
as on the arrival rates λi, i ∈ T of these tasks. As a first step,
whenever a tasks’ owner (e.g., a service provider or a third
party) requires that its tasks be serviced, it will give the details
and characteristics of these tasks to the network operator
(through service-level agreements for example) which would
enter these details into the command center. Subsequently, the
command center can insert this information into appropriate
databases that the agents can access through, for example, an
Internet connection. Such a transfer of information through
active databases has been recently utilized in many communi-
cation architectures, for example, in cognitive radio network
for primary user information distribution [32], or in UAVs
operation [33]. In cases where the command center controls
only a single set of agents and a single area, this information
can be, instead, broadcast directly to the agents. Further, the
agents are also required to know the capabilities of each
others, notably, the link transmission capacity µi, ∀i ∈ M
and the velocity (which can be used to deduce the switchover
times). As the agents are all owned by a single operator, this
information can be easily fed to the agents at the beginning of
all time prior to their deployment, and, thus, does not require
any additional communication during coalition formation.
From the tasks perspective, the amount of information that
needs to be known is much less than that of the agents,
notably since the tasks are, in general, resource-limited en-
tities. For instance, as mentioned in the previous section,
for performing coalition formation, the tasks do not need
to know about the existence or the characteristics of each
others. The main information that needs to be known by
the tasks is the actual presence of agents. The agents can
initially announce/broadcast their presence to the tasks as soon
as they enter into the network. Subsequently, the tasks need
only to be able to enquire, over a control channel, about the
potential utility they would receive from joining the coalition
of a particular agent (which can contain other tasks or agents
but this is transparent from the perspective of the tasks). The
main reason for this is that the tasks have no benefit in forming
coalitions that have no agents since such coalitions generate 0
utility for the tasks. Hence, from the point of view of the tasks,
6Our model can accommodate the case in which the command center and
the central receiver coincide, e.g., in a small single-area network.
they would see every agent as a black box which can provide
a certain payoff (communicated over a control channel during
negotiation phase), and, based on this, they decide to join the
coalition one or another agent (if multiple agents are in the
same coalition then they would offer the same benefit from
the tasks perspective). Note that, for coalitions that contain
multiple agents, the task needs only to ask one agent about
their potential utility. In fact, this agent can append, along
with the information on the utility, a signal to the tasks about
other agents that belong to the same coalition. By doing so,
the tasks would no longer need to assess whether to join a
coalition by enquiring from other agents that belong to the
same coalition, i.e., having redundant information. Hence, by
sending this additional information, the agent will enable the
tasks to avoid doing multiple processing for the same enquiry.
Given the information that needs to be known by each
player, the proposed algorithm can be implemented in a
distributed way since the switch operations can be performed
by the tasks or the agents independently of any centralized
entity. In this regard, given a partition Π, in order to determine
its preferred switch operation, an agent would assess the payoff
it would obtain by joining with any coalition in Π, except
for singleton coalitions composed of agents only. For the
tasks, given Π, each task negotiates with only the agents
(and the coalition to which they belong) in the network in
order to evaluate its payoff and decide on a switch operation.
By adopting a distributed implementation, one would reduce
the overhead and computational load on the command center,
notably when this command center is controlling numerous
areas with different groups of agents (each such area is
represented by the model of Fig. 1). Further, the distributed
approach allows to decentralize the intelligence, and, thus,
reduces the detrimental effects on the network and the tasks’
owners that can be caused by failures or malicious behavior
at the command center level. It is also important to note
that the distributed approach complies better with the nature
of both the agents and the tasks. On one hand, the agents
are inherently autonomous nodes (partially controlled by the
command center) that need to operate on their own and, thus,
make distributed decisions [1]–[6]. On the other hand, the
tasks are independent entities that belong to different owners.
Consequently, the tasks are apt to make their own decisions
regarding coalition formation and are, generally, unwilling to
accept a coalitional structure imposed by an external entity
such as the command center. Nonetheless, we note that a
centralized approach can also be adopted for the proposed
algorithm notably in small networks where, for example, the
command center coincides with the central receiver and owns
all the tasks.
Regarding complexity, the main complexity lies in the
switch operation, the solution to the traveling salesman prob-
lem, i.e., determining the order in which the tasks are visited
within a coalition in order to evaluate the utility function,
and the assignment of agents as either collectors or relays.
For instance, given a present coalitional structure Π where
each coalition in Π has at least one task, for every agent, the
computational complexity of finding its next coalition, i.e.,
performing a switch operation, is easily seen to be O(|Π|),
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and the worst case scenario is when all the tasks act alone,
in that case |Π| = T . In contrast, for the tasks, the worst
case complexity is O(M) since, in order to make a switch
operation, the tasks need only to negotiate with agents. With
regards to the traveling salesman solution, the complexity of
the used nearest neighbor solution is well known to be linear
in the number of cities, i.e., tasks [22], hence, for a coalition
Sk ∈ Π, the complexity of finding the traveling salesman
solution is simply O(|Sk ∩ T |), where Sk ∩ T is the set
of tasks inside coalition Sk. During coalition formation, i.e.,
Phase II of the algorithm, whenever a coalition Sk is formed,
this coalition needs to compute its own traveling salesman
problem, which has a linear complexityO(|Sk∩T |), as already
mentioned. Certainly, the overall number of traveling salesman
problems that should be solved also depends on the number
of new coalitions that were potentially evaluated for coalition
formation prior to convergence to the Nash-stable partition.
Hence, the number of traveling salesman solutions that need
to be computed is proportional to the number of coalitions (and
the identity and number of the tasks within) that negotiated a
potential coalition formation prior to convergence. This cer-
tainly depends on the number of iterations till convergence and
the number of switch operations that occurred. Nonetheless,
for static environments, after coalition formation ends, i.e., in
Phase III of the algorithm in Table I, the traveling salesman
solution needs to be computed only once for each coalition
and, afterwards, the network can operate indefinitely (if the
environment is static) without any need for the coalitions to
re-compute the traveling salesman solution.
Additionally, for determining whether a agent acts as a
collector or relay within any coalition, we consider that the
players would compute this configuration by inspecting all
combinations and selecting the one that maximizes the utility
in (7). This computation is done during coalition formation
for evaluating the potential utility, and, upon convergence,
is maintained during network operation. As the number of
agents in a single coalition is generally small, this computation
is straightforward, and has reasonable complexity. Finally, in
dynamic environments, as the algorithm is repeated period-
ically and since we consider only periodic low mobility, the
complexity of hedonic coalition formation is comparable to the
static environment case, but with more runs of the algorithm.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For simulations, the following network is set up: A central
receiver is placed at the origin of a 4 km ×4 km square area
with the tasks appearing in the area around it. The path loss
parameters are set to α = 3 and κ = 1, the target SNR is
set to ν0 = 10 dB, the pricing factor is set to δ = 1, and the
noise variance σ2 = −120 dBm. All packets are considered
of size 256 bits which is a typical IP packet size. The agents
are considered as having a constant velocity of η = 60 km/h,
a transmit power of P˜ = 100 mW, and a transmission link
capacity of µ = 768 kbps (assumed the same for all agents).
Further, we consider two classes of tasks in the network.
A first class that can be mapped to voice services having
an arrival rate of 32 kbps, and a second class that can be
mapped to video services, such as the widely known Quarter
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Fig. 2. A snapshot of a final coalition structure resulting from the proposed
algorithm for a network of M = 5 agents and T = 10 tasks. In every
coalition, the agents (collectors and relays) visit the tasks continuously in the
shown order.
Common Intermediate Format (QCIF) [34], having an arrival
rate 128 kbps. Tasks belonging to each class are generated with
equal probability in the simulations. Unless stated otherwise,
the throughput-delay tradeoff parameter β is set to 0.7, to
indicate services that are reasonably delay tolerant.
In Fig. 2, we show a snapshot of the final network partition
reached through the proposed hedonic coalition formation
algorithm for a network consisting of M = 5 agents and
T = 10 arbitrarily located tasks. In this figure, Tasks 1, 3,
and 8 belong to the QCIF video class with an arrival rate of
128 kbps, while the remaining tasks belong to the voice class
with an arrival rate of 32 kbps. In Fig. 2, we can easily see how
the agents and tasks can agree on a partition whereby a number
of agents service a group of nearby tasks for data collection
and transmission. For the network of Fig. 2, the tasks are
distributed into three coalitions, two of which (coalitions S1
and S3) are served by a single collector-agent. In contrast,
coalition S2 is served by two collectors and one relay. The
agents in coalition 2 distributed their roles (relay or collector)
depending on the achieved utility. For instance, for coalition
S2, having two collectors and one relay provides a utility of
v(S2) = 52.25 while having three collectors yields a utility
of v(S2) = 10.59 , and having one collector and two relays
yields a utility of v(S2) = 45.19. As a result, the case of two
collectors and one relay maximizes the utility and is agreed
upon between the players. Further, the coalitions in Fig. 2 are
dynamic, in the sense that, within each coalition, the agents
move from one task to the other, collecting and transmitting
data to the receiver continuously. The order in which the agents
visit the tasks, as indicated in Fig. 2, is generated using a
nearest neighbor solution for the traveling salesman problem
as given by Property 3. For example, consider coalition S2 in
Fig. 2. In this coalition, agents 3 an 5 act as a single collector
and move from task 1, to task 3, to task 10, and then back to
task 1 repeating these visits in a cyclic manner. Concurrently
with the collectors movement, agent 2 of coalition S2, moves
and positions itself at the middle of the line connecting the
task being serviced by agents 3 and 5 to the central receiver.
In other words, when the collectors are servicing task 1 agent
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Fig. 3. Performance statistics, in terms of maximum, average and minimum
(over the order of play) player payoff, of the proposed algorithm compared
to an algorithm that allocates the neighboring tasks equally among the agents
as the number of tasks increases for M = 5 agents.
2 is at the middle of the line connecting task 1 to the central
receiver, subsequently when the collectors are servicing task
3 agent 2 takes position at the middle of the line connecting
task 3 to the central receiver and so on. Finally, note that, for
all the coalitions in Fig. 2 one can verify that the minimum
number of collectors, as per Proposition 1 is approximately 1,
(e.g., for coalition S2, we have |GS2 |min = 924 thus 1 collector
is a minimum), and, hence, this condition is easily satisfied
by the coalition formation process.
In Fig. 3, we assess the performance of the proposed
algorithm, in terms of the payoff (revenue) per player (agent
or task) for a network having M = 5 agents, as the number
of tasks increases. The figure shows the statistics (averaged
over the random positions of the tasks), in terms of maximum,
average, and minimum over the random order of play. We
compare the performance with an algorithm that assigns the
tasks equally among the agents (i.e., an equal group of
neighboring tasks are assigned for every agent). Fig. 3 shows
that the performance of both algorithms is bound to decrease
as the number of tasks increases. This is mainly due to the
fact that, for networks having a larger number of tasks, the
delay incurred per coalition, and, thus, per user increases.
This increase in the delay is not only due to the increase in
the number of tasks, but also to the increase in the distance
that the agents need to travel within their corresponding
coalitions (increase in switchover times). In Fig. 3, we note
that the minimum payoff achieved by the proposed algorithm
is comparable to that of the equal allocation. Hence, the per-
formance of the proposed algorithm is clearly lower bounded
by the equal allocation algorithm. However, Fig. 3 shows that
the average and maximum payoff resulting by the proposed
algorithm is significantly better than the equal allocation at all
network sizes up to T = 25 tasks. Albeit this performance
improvement decreases with the increase in the number of
tasks, the performance, in terms of average payoff per player,
yielded by the proposed algorithm is no less than 30.26%
better than the equal allocation for up to T = 25 tasks. Beyond
T = 25 tasks, Fig. 3 shows that the average and maximum
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Fig. 4. Performance statistics, in terms of maximum, average and minimum
(over the order of play) player payoff, of the proposed algorithm compared
to an algorithm that allocates the neighboring tasks equally among the agents
as the number of agents increases for T = 20 tasks.
performance of the proposed algorithm is comparable to that
of the equal allocation, notably at T = 40 tasks. The reduction
in the performance gap between the two algorithms for large
networks stems from the fact that, as more tasks exist in
the network, for a fixed number of agents, the possibility
of forming large coalitions, using the proposed algorithm is
reduced, and, hence, the structure becomes closer to equal
allocation.
In Fig. 4, we show the statistics (averaged over the random
positions of the tasks), in terms of maximum, average, and
minimum (over the random order of play) payoff per player
for a network with T = 20 tasks as the number of agents M
increases. The performance is once again compared with an
algorithm that assigns the tasks equally among the agents (i.e.,
an equal group of neighboring tasks are assigned for every
agent). Fig. 4 shows that the performance of both algorithms
increases as the number of agents increases. This is mainly due
to the fact that when more agents are deployed, the tasks can
be better serviced as the delay incurred per coalition decreases
and the probability of successful transmission improves. For
instance, as more agents enter the network, they can act
as either collectors (for improving the delay) or relays (for
improving the success probability). We note that, at M = 3,
the performance statistics of the proposed algorithm converge
to the equal allocation algorithm since, for a small number of
agents, the flexibility of forming coalitions is quite restricted
and equal allocation is the most straightforward coalitional
structure. Nonetheless, Fig. 4 shows that, as M increases, the
performance of the proposed algorithm, in terms of maximum
and average payoff achieved, becomes significantly larger than
that of the equal allocation algorithm, and this performance
advantage increases as more agents are deployed. Finally,
Fig. 4 also shows that the minimum performance of the
proposed algorithm is comparable to the equal allocation
algorithm for network with a small number of agents, but as
the number of agents increases, the minimum performance of
hedonic coalition formation is 29% better than equal allocation
at M = 7, and this advantage increases further with M .
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In Fig. 5, we show the average and maximum (over the
random order of play) coalition size resulting from the pro-
posed algorithm as the number of tasks T increases, for a
network of M = 5 agents and arbitrarily deployed tasks.
These results are averaged over the random positions of the
tasks and are compared with the equal allocation algorithm.
Fig. 5 shows that, as the number of tasks increases, the
average coalition size for both algorithms increases. For the
proposed algorithm, the maximum coalition size also increases
with the number of tasks. This is an immediate result of the
fact that, as the number of tasks increases, the probability of
forming larger coalitions is higher and, hence, our proposed
algorithm yields larger coalitions. Further, at all network sizes,
the proposed algorithm yields coalitions that are relatively
larger than the equal allocation algorithm. This result implies
that, by allowing the players (agents and tasks) to selfishly
select their coalitions, through the proposed algorithm, the
players have an incentive to structure themselves in coalitions
with average size lower bounded by the equal allocation. In
a nutshell, through hedonic coalition formation, the resulting
topology mainly consists of networks composed of a large
number of small coalitions as demonstrated by the average
coalition size. However, in a limited number of cases, the
network topology can also be composed of a small number
of large coalitions as highlighted by the maximum coalition
size shown in Fig. 5.
In Fig. 6, we show, over a period of 5 minutes, the
frequency in terms of average switch operations per minute
per player (agent or task) achieved for various velocities of
the tasks in a mobile wireless network with M = 5 agents
and different number of tasks. As the velocity of the tasks
increases, the frequency of the switch operations increases
for both T = 10 and T = 20 due to the changes in the
positions of the various tasks incurred by mobility. Fig. 6
shows that the case of T = 20 tasks yields a frequency
of switch operations significantly higher than the case of
T = 10 tasks. This result is interpreted by the fact that,
as the number of tasks increases, the possibility of finding
new partners as the tasks move increases significantly, hence
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Fig. 6. Frequency of switch operations per minute per player achieved
over a period of 5 minutes for different tasks’ velocities in a network having
M = 5 agents and different number of mobile tasks.
yielding an increase in the topology variation as reflected by
the number of switch operations. In summary, this figure shows
that hedonic coalition formation allows the agents and the
tasks to self-organize and adapt their topology to mobility,
through adequate switch operations.
The network’s adaptation to mobility is further assessed in
Fig. 7, where we show, over a period of 5 minutes, the average
coalition lifespan (in seconds) achieved for various velocities
of the tasks in a mobile wireless network with M = 5 agents
and different number of tasks. The coalition lifespan is defined
as the time (in seconds) during which a coalition is present
in the mobile network prior to accepting new members or
breaking into smaller coalitions (due to switch operations).
Fig. 7 shows that, as the velocity of the tasks increases,
the average lifespan of a coalition decreases. This is due
to the fact that, as mobility increases, the possibility of
forming new coalitions or splitting existing coalitions increases
significantly. For example, for T = 20, the coalition lifespan
drops from around 124 seconds for a tasks’ velocity of 10 km/h
to just under a minute as of 30 km/h, and down to around
42 seconds at 50 km/h. Furthermore, Fig. 7 shows that as
more tasks are present in the network, the coalition lifespan
decreases. For instance, for any given velocity, the lifespan of
a coalition for a network with T = 10 tasks is significantly
larger than that of a coalition in a network with T = 20 tasks.
This is a direct result of the fact that, for a given tasks’ velocity,
as more tasks are present in the network, the players are able
to find more partners to join with, and hence the lifespan of
the coalitions becomes shorter. In brief, Fig. 7 provides an
interesting assessment of the topology adaptation aspect of
the proposed algorithm through the process of forming new
coalitions or breaking existing coalitions.
Moreover, for further analysis of the self-adapting aspect
of the proposed algorithm, we study the variations of the
coalitional structure over time for a network where tasks
are entering and leaving the network. For this purpose, in
Fig. 8, we show the variations of the average (over the random
positions of the tasks) number of players per coalition, i.e., the
average coalition size, over a period of 10 minutes, as new
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Fig. 7. Average coalition lifespan (in seconds) achieved over a period of 5
minutes for different tasks’ velocities in a network having M = 5 agents and
different number of mobile tasks.
tasks join the network and/or existing tasks leave the network.
The considered network in Fig. 8 possesses M = 5 agents and
starts with T = 15 tasks. The results are shown for different
rates of change which is defined as the number of tasks that
have either entered the network or left the network per minute.
For example, a rate of change of 2 tasks per minute indicates
that either 2 tasks enter the network every minute, 2 tasks
leave the network every minute, or 1 tasks enters the network
and another tasks leaves the network every minute (these cases
may occur with equal probability). In this figure, we can see
that, as time evolves, the structure of the network is changing,
with new coalitions forming and other breaking as reflected by
the change in coalitions size. Furthermore, we note that, as the
rate of change increases, the changes in the topology increase.
For instance, it is seen in Fig. 8 that for a rate of change of
5 tasks per minute, the variations in the coalition size are
much larger than for the case of 2 tasks per minute (which is
almost constant for many periods of time). In summary, Fig. 8
shows the network topology variations as tasks enter or leave
the network. Note that, after the 10 minutes have elapsed, the
network re-enters in the Phase III of the algorithm where data
collection and transmission occurs.
In Fig. 9, we assess the performance of the proposed
algorithm, in terms of the payoff (revenue) per player (agent or
task) for a network having M = 5 agents and T = 20 tasks,
as the throughput-delay tradeoff parameter β increases. The
figure shows the statistics, in terms of maximum, average,
and minimum over the random order of play between the
players. Fig. 9 shows that, for small β, the performance of
the proposed algorithm is comparable to the equal allocation
algorithm and the payoffs are generally small. This result is
due to the fact that, for small β, the tasks are highly delay
sensitive, and the delay component of the utility governs the
performance. Hence, for such tasks, the proposed algorithm
yields a performance similar to equal allocation. However, as
the tradeoff parameter β increases, the maximum and average
utility yielded by our proposed algorithm outperforms the
equal allocation algorithm significantly. For instance, as of
β = 0.5, hedonic coalition formation is highly desirable,
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(over the order of play) player payoff, of the proposed algorithm compared to
an algorithm that allocates the neighboring tasks equally among the agents as
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and presents a performance improvement in terms of average
payoff of around 19.56% relative to the equal allocation
algorithm (at β = 0.55, the proposed algorithm has an
average payoff of 0.55 while equal allocation has an average
payoff of 0.46). This advantage increases with β. Note that,
for all tradeoff parameters, the performance of the proposed
algorithm, in terms of minimum (over order of play) payoff
gained by a player is lower bounded by equal allocation and,
in average, outperforms the equal allocation algorithm.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced a novel model for task allo-
cation among a number of autonomous agents in a wireless
communication network. In this model, a number of wireless
agents are required to service several tasks, arbitrarily located
in a given area. Each task represents a queue of packets that
require collection and wireless transmission to a centralized
receiver by the agents. The task allocation problem is modeled
as a hedonic coalition formation game between the agents and
the tasks that interact in order to form disjoint coalitions. Each
formed coalition is mapped to a polling system which consists
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of a number of agents continuously collecting packets from a
number of tasks. Within a coalition, the agents can act either as
collectors that move between the different tasks present in the
coalition for collecting the packet data, or relays for improving
the wireless transmission of the data packets. For forming the
coalitions, we introduce an algorithm that allows the players
(tasks or agents) to join or leave the coalitions based on their
preferences which capture the tradeoff between the effective
throughput and the delay achieved by the coalition. We study
the properties and characteristics of the proposed model, we
show that the proposed hedonic coalition formation algorithm
always converges to a Nash-stable partition, and we study
how the proposed algorithm allows the agents and tasks to
take distributed decisions for adapting the network topology
to environmental changes such as the deployment of new
tasks, the removal of existing tasks or the mobility of the
tasks. Simulation results show how the proposed algorithm
allows the agents and tasks to self-organize into independent
coalitions, while improving the performance, in terms of
average player (agent or task) payoff, of at least 30.26% (for
a network of 5 agents with up to 25 tasks) relatively to a
scheme that allocates nearby tasks equally among the agents.
In a nutshell, by combining concepts from wireless networks,
queueing theory and novel concepts from coalitional game
theory, we proposed a new model for task allocation among
autonomous agents in communication networks which is well
suited for many practical applications such as data collection,
data transmission, autonomous relaying, operation of message
ferry (mobile base stations), surveillance, monitoring, or main-
tenance in next-generation wireless networks.
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